We consider a random matching model where agents have complete access to each others' histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing given random unobservable incomes. There is capital accumulation and an endogenous interest rate. The key feature of this environment is that information is mobile across locations while there are frictions associated with transporting goods. Optimal allocations in the dynamic private information environment resemble real-world credit arrangements in that there are credit balances, credit limits, and installment payments. The steady state has the property that there is a limiting distribution of expected utility entitlements with mobility and a positive fraction of agents who are credit constrained. 
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we construct and study an economic environment in which intertemporal allocation, interpreted as a credit arrangement, occurs in an environment in which there are frictions associated with the movement of goods across locations, but where information ‡ows are unrestricted. Economic agents in this environment will each consume in a sequence of separate randomly-determined locations, but will be able to communicate with a centralized "credit" agency at each date. We construct a model in which each of a continuum of agents is matched randomly with a location in each period, and production and the accumulation of capital takes place at a centralized location. Consumption goods are shipped to each dispersed location from the central location at the beginning of each period, before any communication can take place, and these shipments of goods are subject to capacity constraints. Agents receive random endowments which are private information, and, as in the pioneering work of Townsend (1982) , the desire to share risk in the presence of private information leads to a motive for intertemporal trade by tying future transfers to current transfers. Our interest here is in how the limitations on the ability to move goods a¤ect risk-sharing, and how features of the solution resemble real-world credit arrangements. To be more concrete, an interpretation of the physical environment and credit arrangement we consider is that it involves a …rm simultaneously engaged in production, retail sales (through a large number of distinct retail outlets), and consumer …nance --for example General Motors.
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Our model is most closely-related to the environment studied by Green (1987) , but we add spatial separation, transportation frictions, a nonnegativity constraint on consumption, capital accumulation, and some other features. The approach we take is similar to what is done in the literature on dynamic private information (e.g. Green 1987 , Spear and Srivastava 1987 , Phelan and Townsend 1991 , Atkeson and Lucas 1992 , and Wang 1995 , in that we analyze the allocation problem of a social planner who seeks to construct an e¢cient allocation subject to the constraints implied by private information and random matching. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) study credit in a random matching environment with an absence-of-doublecoincidence-of-wants friction, where the focus is on the residual role of money.
The economy here is very similar to that in Aiyagari (1994) . The key di¤erences are that there is random matching and allocations are (private information) constrained e¢cient in the economy studied here, whereas in Aiyagari (1994) all agents were together at all dates and the market structure and borrowing constraints were exogenously imposed. As in Aiyagari (1994) , there is capital accumulation in the model constructed here, which is in contrast to most dynamic private information models, with the exception of Ravikumar (1997a, 1997b) .
E¢cient allocations in our model can be determined by solving a set of recursive component planning problems, as in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) . We use this approach to determine the characteristics of limiting distributions for this environment. We …nd that a limiting distribution always exists, and it exhibits mobility, i.e. individual agents are mobile within the steady state distribution of wealth. The e¢cient allocation has features which resemble real-world credit systems. That is, agents have credit balances, and there are credit limits and installment payments. Further, and in spite of the fact that the marginal utility of consumption is in…nite at zero and that the probability of receiving a zero endowment is positive, there is a positive mass of agents who are credit-constrained in the steady state. This contrasts with results from incomplete markets models where imperfect consumption-smoothing is obtained by exogenously shutting down markets (e.g. Aiyagari 1994 ). However, as in Aiyagari (1994) we …nd that the interest rate is less than the time preference rate and that there is capital overaccumulation relative to a public information economy.
There are two important novelties here. The …rst is that we study a pure credit arrangement in a random matching environment where there is no (social) role for monetary exchange. Second, we obtain a limiting distribution with mobility through an alternative to existing approaches in the literature.
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In our model, the interest rate is endogenous, and there is capital accumulation. Allowing for capital accumulation rules out equilibrium interest rates which imply degenerate limiting distributions of expected utilities where all agents converge to the upper bound on expected utilities (here, the upper bound is implied by the resource constraints which come from random matching and immobility of resources across locations). Also, our economy satis…es "non-attainability of misery" as in Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995) , which prevents a degenerate distribution where all agents are at the lower bound on expected utilities (given by the nonnegativity constraint on consumption and incentive compatibility).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model, and in Section 3 we specify the problem the social planner solves to determine e¢cient allocations. Section 4 reformulates the component planning problem associated with the problem in Section 3 in terms of a Bellman equation, and describes a procedure for analyzing the limiting distribution of expected utilities. In Section 5, we use the Bellman equation to characterize the e¢cient allocation and the limiting distribution of expected utilities. Section 6 contains a discussion of the results and assumptions, and Section 7 contains a summary and conclusion. The Appendix contains proofs of various lemmas and propositions.
THE MODEL
The population consists of a continuum of in…nite-lived agents with unit mass, each of whom has preferences given by
where 0 <¯< 1; c t is consumption, and u(¢) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es decreasing absolute risk aversion. Assume that u(0) = 0 and u
There is a continuum of dispersed locations, also with unit mass, and a distinct central location inhabited by the social planner.
At the beginning of each period, agents are matched pairwise and at random with dispersed locations and each agent receives an endowment, µ t ; which is an i.i.d. (across agents and time) draw from a probability distribution F (µ t ); where µ t¸0 : The agent's endowment is private information. At the beginning of period t; the social planner has k t units of capital available at the central location, where k 0 is given. Capital can be used by the planner to produce consumption goods at the beginning of the period, according to the production function g(k t ): We assume that g(¢) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously di¤erentiable, with g(0) = 0; g 0 (0) = 1; and
After consumption goods are produced at the central location, goods are transported costlessly to each dispersed location. Let x i t denote the quantity of consumption goods transported to location i 2 [0; 1]: We assume that there is a capacity constraint on the transportation of goods to locations, that is x i t · x ¤ for all i; where x ¤ > 0: Given the assumptions made below, this capacity constraint will be the critical restriction that limits consumption at any location in the steady state. In principle, consumption could be limited by the production technology in the steady state. However, we assume thatk > E(µ t ) and
wherek is the solution to
The …rst inequality in (1) is designed to guarantee that transfers to agents are limited by transportation capacity and not by available output. This assumption makes it possible to separate the problem of optimal capital accumulation from that of optimal transfers to agents and makes the problem tractable. The second inequality in (1) implies that complete insurance can be an outcome under full information with respect to agents' endowments. This inequality is a su¢cient condition for transportation capacity to be non-binding in attaining complete insurance, and thus we know that any deviation from complete insurance will be due to private information. This is not to say that private information will not interact with the transportation capacity constraint in determining the allocation, only that the capacity constraint does not matter with full information. Assumption (1) is discussed in more detail in Section 6.
We also assume, to simplify some of the exposition, that when the social planner sends consumption goods to locations, it is not yet known which agents are matched with which locations for the period. This is a natural restriction to impose in our random matching framework, and in general it enhances the friction already inherent in the fact that there exists a transportation capacity constraint.
After consumption goods arrive at a given location and the agent receives her endowment, the agent receives a transfer (which could be negative) which is determined by the agent's reported history (recorded with the social planner) and the agent's report of her current endowment shock. Consumption goods can not be moved across locations during the period, but at the end of the period any consumption goods not consumed are transported back to the social planner and converted, one-for-one, into capital.
The environment laid out here captures the following features of developed economies.
First, some production occurs locally but much production, particularly of physical goods, requires that these goods be transported to remote locations for consumption. Second, this movement of goods is costly, and the quantity of goods that can be transported is limited by the infrastructure in place. Third, moving information is much easier than moving goods; in the model information moves costlessly, in that agents and the social planner can communicate without cost across locations.
Fourth, incomes are subject to risk and di¢cult to verify, and this leads to the need for insurance; in practice economic agents self-insure in part by engaging in credit
arrangements.
An interpretation of the allocation arrangement that will be studied in the remainder of the paper is that the social planner plays the role of a …nancial intermediary, and agents at dispersed locations will be able to smooth consumption by holding credit balances with this intermediary. When an agent's endowment is low (high)
she will tend to draw down (increase) this credit balance in order to consume more (less) in the present, and less (more) in the future. The …nancial intermediary is also engaged in production, and the distribution of consumption goods to remote locations.
EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
To study allocation in this environment, we …rst examine the general allocation problem faced by the social planner in this section. In the next section, we show how this problem can be formulated in a tractable recursive form.
The social planner is given Ã 0 (w); the distribution of date 0 expected utilities across agents, and k 0 ; the initial capital stock. The goal of the planner is to deliver Ã 0 (w)
to the continuum of agents in an e¢cient manner, given the technology and k 0 :
Each period, when goods are produced using the current capital stock, these good are shipped out to each location. If equal quantities of consumption goods are not transported to locations in each period, this can only introduce the possibility of more randomness in agents' consumptions, and it cannot help incentives. Thus, there is no loss from considering only allocations where x i t = x t for all t and all i 2 [0; 1]; and we can therefore drop i superscripts from the subsequent analysis. Also, the social planner will ship the largest quantity of goods possible, as this can only relax constraints in the planner's optimization problem. Thus, we have
Given the shipments of goods to locations, agents receive transfers (speci…ed by the social planner) contingent on their initial expected utilities and histories. Let f¿ t (w 0 ; µ t )g 1 t=0 denote the sequence of transfers received by an agent given the sequence of locations she visits, where µ t = fµ 0 ; µ 1 ; :::; µ t g denotes the agent's history of endowment shock reports to date t and w 0 is the agent's date 0 expected utility entitlement. At the end of period t; goods not transferred to agents are shipped back to the social planner and are converted one-for-one into capital, k t+1 : Thus, aggregate transfers and k t implicitly determine k t+1 :
given k 0 ; which satisfy
for all w 0 ; for all w 0 ; for all t; for all µ t ; and for all (µ 0 ; µ 1 ; :::; µ t¡1 ; µ 0 );
for all w 0 ; t; and µ t ; k t+1¸0 (6)
for all t:
In the above de…nition, (3) is a promise-keeping constraint, (4) are temporary incentive compatibility constraints, (5) is the resource constraint, (6) is a nonnegativity constraint on capital, and (7) captures the capacity constraint on goods shipped to each location.
De…nition 2 An allocation (¿; k) attains Ã 0 with resource cost z 2 R if
for all t; and (3)- (7) are satis…ed.
In the above de…nition, ¹(µ t ) is the distribution of the history µ t over agents:
De…nition 3 An allocation (¿; k) is e¢cient if it attains Ã 0 with cost z; and if there exists no other allocation which attains Ã 0 with cost z 0 < z:
Now, we follow Atkeson and Lucas (1995) , in decentralizing the problem of determining e¢cient allocations by considering component planning problems. Equivalently, this could be considered an approach to determining e¢cient allocations using "e¢ciency prices." First suppose that there is a planner at the central location who starts with the initial capital stock, k 0 ; at the beginning of the …rst period. In each period, this planner produces given the existing capital stock, retains some output to accumulate capital for the succeeding period, retains an additional amount of output (denoted T t ) to pay for transfers to consumers, and sells the remaining output, facing the sequence of intertemporal prices fp t g 1 t=0 : Here, pt ps denotes the relative price of period t consumption goods and period s consumption goods, and we can choose the numeraire arbitrarily. As in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) , rather than work with
; it proves more convenient to work with the price sequence fq t g 1 t=0 ; where p 0 = 1 ¡ q 0 and p t = (1 ¡ q t ) Q t¡1 s=0 q s for t > 0; with q t 2 (0; 1) for all t: Also note that we can determine fq t g 1 t=0 in terms of fp t g 1 t=0 ; since q 0 = 1 ¡ p 0 and q t =
1¡
P t s=0 ps 1¡ P t¡1 s=0 ps ; for t > 0: Further, the gross interest rate in period t is
. Thus, this planner can borrow and lend at market prices, and maximizes the present discounted value of pro…ts.
In addition to the planner at the central location, there is a planner associated with each initial expected utility entitlement w 0 : At the beginning of each period, the planner at the central location ships x t = min[x ¤ ; g(k t )] units of consumption goods to each dispersed location. Then, after agents have been randomly allocated to locations, the planner associated with w 0 receives a report from each of the agents for whom she has responsibility, and makes a transfer to each. Any consumption goods not transferred to agents are returned to the planner at the central location at the end of the period. The planner responsible for agents with initial expected utility entitlement w 0 minimizes the cost of delivering w 0 given the price sequence fq t g 1 t=0
and the sequence of shipments fx t g 1 t=0 from the planner at the central location. That is, she chooses f¿ t (w 0 ; µ
It is then straightforward to apply Theorem 1 in Atkeson and Lucas (1995, page 70) to show that if there exists an allocation (¿; k), prices fq t g 1 t=0 ; an initial distribution of expected utility entitlements Ã 0 (w); and aggregate resources z such that (¿; k) solves the above minimization and maximization problems given fq t g 1 t=0 (each planner optimizes given prices), (8) is satis…ed with equality for all t (market clearing), and
then (¿; k) attains Ã 0 with resources z and is e¢cient.
A potential complication in using the above characterization of e¢cient allocations is that the total transfers fT t g appearing in (10) may depend on fk t g: This makes it di¢cult to characterize an e¢cient fk t g sequence. A way around this di¢culty is provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let the sequence fk
and
where fq t g 1 t=0 satis…es (11). Let f¿ ¤ t (w 0 ; µ t )g 1 t=0 solve (9) subject to (3)-(5) and suppose that (8) is satis…ed with equality for all t: Then (¿ ¤ ; k ¤ ) attains Ã 0 with resources z and is e¢cient.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition is useful since it provides a way of characterizing an e¢cient sequence of capital stocks using (12), provided (13) holds, and an e¢cient sequence of transfers by solving problem (9) subject to (3)-(5). Note that by virtue of (13), the resource constraint for the problem (9) can be replaced by
so that the fk t g sequence no longer enters problem (9).
In the next section we con…ne attention to steady states and use dynamic programming methods to solve problem (9) and thereby construct stationary e¢cient allocations.
BELLMAN EQUATION AND STEADY STATE EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
Assume now that there are only two states, i.e. µ t 2 f0; yg; where Pr[µ t = y] = ¼;
We will con…ne attention to steady states, where q t = q 2 [¯; 1) for all t: Let k q be such that
By virtue of assumptions (1) and (2) we have g(k q ) > x ¤ : Therefore, the sequence of capital stocks k t = k q satis…es the conditions (12) and (13) in Proposition 1. Now, in a steady state, the other component planning problems can be speci…ed in recursive form in terms of the following Bellman equation, where the cost function V q (w) is interpreted as the minimum expected present discounted value of transfers required in delivering an expected utility entitlement of w to a particular agent, given q:
(
where w= ¼u(y) and
Here, (16) is a promise-keeping constraint, (17) and (18) Now that we have a recursive representation of the component planning problems,
we can proceed to an analysis of steady state e¢cient allocations. We will consider the steady state where z = 0; that is, where the total net transfer to agents is zero.
We can think of solving for the steady state as follows. Given a price q; we can solve for the steady state quantity of capital, k q ; from (14). Then, we can solve (15) subject to (16)-(19) to obtain V q (w); ¿ 1;q (w); ¿ 0;q (w); w 1;q (w); and w 0;q (w): This then implies a dynamic stochastic path for w; and we can accordingly solve for Ã q (w); the steady state distribution of expected utility entitlements across agents. Then, we must have
where the left-hand side of (20) is output per capita at the beginning of the period minus capital set aside at the end of the period, and the right-hand side of (20) is total transfers per capita. We can write (20) as
where
Then, we can ask whether (21) is satis…ed and, if not, then try another q; etc.
For the analysis, it will be convenient to rewrite the Bellman equation by changing
We then have C (0) = 0 and C 0 (0) = 0: Then, let u 1 (w) = u(y + ¿ 1 (w)) and u 0 (w) = u(¿ 0 (w)) so that
). We will also assume that if an agent claims the high endowment, y; then she must be able to show it. This assumption allows us to ignore the incentive constraint (18), so that we only need to worry about the incentive constraint (17).
With the above changes in notation and the added assumption, we can rewrite the Bellman equation as follows:
CHARACTERIZING THE STEADY STATE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION
Using the procedure outlined in the previous section, we can now move to a derivation of the properties of the steady state e¢cient allocation. The …rst step is to show that the cost function, V q (¢) is well-behaved, and then to obtain a characterization of the solution to the Bellman equation. This is done in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: (a) V q (¢) is strictly increasing, convex, and continuously di¤erentiable. that agents consume at least as much in the high-endowment state as in the lowendowment state, and that future expected utility entitlements are at least as large in the high-endowment state as in the low-endowment state. In other words, the current utility allocations lie between the full-insurance and no-insurance allocations.
To see this, note that the incentive constraint (23) must always bind. Otherwise, we must obtain the full insurance solution with u 1 (w) = u 0 (w) and w 1 (w) = w 0 (w) which violates (23). It follows, with c i (w)´C(u i (w)); i = 0; 1; that w 1 (w)¸w 0 (w) implies u 1 (w) · u(y + C(u 0 (w))) or c 1 (w) · y + c 0 (w): Thus, we have c 0 (w) · c 1 (w) · y + c 0 (w): That is, the solution lies between the full-insurance and no-insurance outcomes. In fact, strict inequality will hold since the incentive constraint binds.
Part (c) in Proposition 2 states that, when the agent's expected utility entitlement falls to the lower bound, w, then if the agent receives the low endowment, she receives a transfer of zero and a future expected utility entitlement of w. However, if the agent is at the lower bound and receives the high endowment, then she gets a negative transfer and an increase in her expected utility entitlement. To see the intuition for this, note that one way to provide w is to give zero transfers currently and promise w in the future regardless of the current report. However, this means it is quite cheap in terms of future resources for the planner to provide w. This implies that it would be pro…table for the planner to marginally increase the future expected utility entitlement in exchange for a negative transfer from the agent in the event of a positive income realization.
Part (d) of Proposition 2 states that, for w in some neighborhood of w, if the agent receives a low endowment then her future expected utility entitlement is set equal to w. This is a key result and will play an important role in ensuring that there will be a positive fraction of credit constrained agents in the steady state. The intuition for this result is as follows. When w is marginally above w and the agent reports zero income, one possibility for the planner is to raise u 0 from zero and raise w 0 from w.
However, note that the right-hand side of the incentive constraint (23) is una¤ected at the margin by increasing u 0 from zero whereas it is a¤ected one-for-one by increasing w 0 from w. Therefore, increasing w 0 imposes higher costs by necessitating increases in u 1 and w 1 to satisfy the incentive constraint. Consequently, the planner will prefer to raise u 0 and keep w 0 at w.
We can now proceed to examine the implications for the steady state distribution of expected utilities, Ã(w); of alternative steady state prices, q 2 [¯; 1): We …rst consider the case q =¯: This case is analyzed in detail in the Appendix, and we state the following proposition here.
Proposition 3: Let q =¯: Then fw t g ! ¹ w a.s.
Proof. See the appendix.
Thus, when q =¯; the limiting distribution of expected utilities is degenerate at ¹ w (see Figure 1 ). Therefore, in the limit each agent receives a transfer of x ¤ in each state. We will therefore have H 2 (q) = x ¤ > H 1 (q) for q =¯where the inequality follows from (1) and (2).
We will now analyze the stochastic process of expected utility entitlements for 1 > q >¯and give conditions under which H 2 (q) < H 1 (q) for some q: This result, together with continuity of H 2 (¢) will establish the existence of a q ¤ 2 (¯; 1) such
The corresponding allocations are e¢cient and support the stationary distribution with zero cost. The …rst step in this process is to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Let q >¯: Then, (i) there existsŵ 2 (w; ¹ w) such that w 1 (w) = w 0 (w) < w for w 2 [ŵ; ¹ w]; and (ii) w 0 (w) < w for w 2 (w; ¹ w):
Proof. From Lemma (4) in the Appendix, and Lemmas (1) and (2), we then know that there exists someŵ < ¹ w such that u 1 (w) = u(y + x ¤ ) and u 0 (w) = u(x ¤ ) for w 2 [ŵ; ¹ w]: Therefore, for w 2 [ŵ; ¹ w] the Bellman equation becomes
Since V q (¢) is convex, without loss of generality we can set w 1 (w) = w 0 (w) = w¡(1¡¯) ¹ w ; and
for w 2 [ŵ; ¹ w]: It follows that, for w 2 [ŵ; ¹ w]; w 1 (w) = w 0 (w) = w¡(1¡¯) ¹ w
< w:
Further, if w 0 (w) =w then w 0 (w) < w for w >w. If w 0 (w) >w then the …rst-order necessary condition for w 0 (w) implies
which implies that w 0 (w) < w by convexity.¤ Thus, the graphs of w 1 (w) and w 0 (w) versus w look as in Figure 2 . While the w 1 (w) curve need not intersect the 45 o line uniquely in (w, ¹ w); there will be a smallest value
and f ¹ wg are the only ergodic sets. We will focus only on stationary distributions which put zero probability on f ¹ wg: It is obvious that there exists a unique stationary distribution for fw t g; and it exhibits mobility: When q >¯; there is a tendency for the expected utility of a given agent to drift down over time, since the planner is more patient than are agents. However, the incentive structure in the optimal allocation will tend to push up (down) the expected utility of agents with low(high) expected utility entitlements when they receive a high (low) endowment.
Now it is straightforward, along the lines of Atkeson and Lucas (1995), 7 to show that H 2 (q) is a continuous function on [¯; 1) (we omit the proof for brevity). What remains is to show that, for some q 2 (¯; 1); H 2 (q) < H 1 (q): We consider two cases below. Letx = g(k 1 ) ¡ k 1 where g 0 (k 1 ) = 1: Case 1 obtains when x ¤ <x: Here, it is obvious that for q su¢ciently close to unity we must have H 2 (q) < H 1 (q): This is because H 2 (q) · x ¤ and H 1 (q)´g(k q ) ¡ k q !x as q ! 1: This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: If x ¤ <x then there exists q 2 (¯; 1) such that H 2 (q) < H 1 (q):
Proof. Obvious from the discussion above. Now suppose we have case 2, where x ¤ >x: De…neŵ;ĉ 0 ; and^as follows.
Note thatŵ 2 (w; ¹ w) andĉ 0 2 (0;x):The former obtains because 0 <x < x ¤ and w = ¼u(y) < ¼u(y +x)
The latter can be seen as follows. Let
Then,
Further, h(¢) is strictly increasing. Hence, there exists a uniqueĉ 0 2 (0;x) which satis…es h(ĉ 0 ) =ŵ:
We can now state a proposition giving conditions such that H 2 (q) < H 1 (q) for some q 2 (¯; 1) when case 2 obtains.
Proposition 6: Suppose x ¤ >x: If¯<^then there exists q 2 (¯; 1) such that
For the intuition behind this Proposition, consider an analogy to a Bewley-type incomplete markets model in which a consumer can save at an interest rate of
If q is su¢ciently close to unity and¯is su¢ciently small, then the consumer faces a very low return on saving, and does not care much for the future. Consequently, her optimal choice will be close to autarkic. In the present context, this means that total transfers will be quite small. That is, H 2 (q) will be small when q is close to unity and¯is su¢ciently small.
We can now state the following proposition.
Proof. Obvious.
The allocation and the stationary distribution associated with q ¤ are e¢cient and consistent with zero total net transfers from the planner. 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We obtain a limiting distribution with mobility of agents over expected utility entitlements for the following reasons. First, due to the nonnegativity constraint on consumption, and the fact that the lower bound on expected utilities is strictly preferred to consuming zero forever, the lower bound on expected utilities is not an absorbing state, and agents will in general tend to drift up from this lower bound.
Second, supposing that q =¯; this upward drift will continue until all agents are at the upper bound on expected utilities, receiving the quantity of consumption permitted by the transportation capacity constraint, independent of their endowment. But this can not be a steady state, as consumption would exceed production. Thus, third, steady state q must be greater than¯; as this will cause agents to forego future claims on consumption, and therefore they will tend to consume less in the steady state, yielding a tendency for expected utility to drift down from the upper bound.
This yields a limiting distribution with mobility.
The stochastic law of motion for fw t g (see Figure 2) has several of the features associated with a credit system, in particular credit balances, credit limits, and variable installments. We can interpret w ¤ ¡w as an agent's credit limit, w¡w as credit available, and w ¤ ¡ w as the current balance.
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If an agent starts with w =w then he/she has no credit available. If no income is received then payment cannot be made, consumption is zero, and the agent will continue to have no credit available. If the agent receives positive income then a payment is made, the remainder is consumed, and in the following period the agent will have w >w, that is the credit balance will be smaller than the credit limit. If the agent continues to receive positive income then he/she continues to consume and to build up the credit balance until it reaches w ¤ ¡w. Then, if the agent receives no income, consumption is positive but the credit balance will be reduced. If the agent continues to receive no income then he/she will eventually reach the credit limit with w =w.
Note that the steady state distribution Ã(w) will have the property that a positive mass of agents is concentrated on the lower bound on expected utility entitlements, w. That is, in the steady state there is a positive mass of agents who are creditconstrained. Now, suppose that we consider an alternative model with incomplete markets, for example Aiyagari (1994) , with a borrowing constraint. In that model, if we had u 0 (0) = 1 and a positive probability of obtaining a zero endowment in any period, as is the case here, then no agents would be credit-constrained. Thus, our private information model has some characteristics which are quite di¤erent from a model where markets are arbitrarily shut down. As the discussion of part (d) of Proposition 1 indicated, this di¤erence is directly attributable to the incentive constraint.
Capital accumulation was introduced in this model so as to make the interest rate endogenous, which ultimately guarantees that q >¯and assures that the limiting distribution of expected utilities exhibits mobility. The implied interest rate is less than the time preference rate, and hence there is capital overaccumulation relative to the public information economy. Both of these features also obtain in incomplete markets models with borrowing constraints.
It is worth noting that the upper bound on transfers implied by random matching and the capacity constraint may or may not be binding in the steady state. In particular, q for some w's in the ergodic set. When the capacity constraint does not bind, the friction on resource movement implied by random matching does not matter and the allocation would continue to be e¢cient if all agents were assumed to be together at the central location at all times. Such an allocation would be a natural benchmark against which one could compare the steady state allocation with an arbitrary market structure and borrowing constraint studied in Aiyagari (1994) .
We now discuss the assumption of a transportation capacity constraint x output. This permits a separation of the problem of choosing the capital stock from that of choosing transfers. That the speci…c nature of these assumptions guarantees q > _ should not be worrisome because if no capacity constraint were imposed then q ·¯can never be a steady state. This is because whenever q ·¯the stationary distribution of expected utilities becomes degenerate at the highest feasible value.
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Hence total transfers equal the highest feasible level of transfers which (in the absence of a capacity constraint) equal total output, i.e. g(k): However, the associated cost is given by g(k) ¡ (g(k) ¡ k) = k > 0: Therefore, q ·¯can never be consistent with a steady state with zero cost. Thus, the speci…c assumptions we made regarding the capacity constraint x ¤ to guarantee q >¯in a steady state do not taint our results concerning the nature of the stationary distribution.
The second inequality in (1) can also be motivated by a consideration of the problem under public information regarding endowments. It turns out that this inequality is a su¢cient condition for the capacity constraint to be non-binding and thereby permits the obvious full insurance outcome. This can be seen as follows. While many full insurance steady state distributions exist under public information, we will focus on one where individuals have identical expected utility entitlements denoted w ¤ : The solution in this case is then given by q =¯; g
Here,k is the steady state capital stock, c ¤ is the constant level of consumption (i.e. there is full insurance), and ¿ 0 and ¿ 1 are the transfers in the bad and good states respectively. To make sure that the capacity constraint is not binding we need to have
which is the second inequality in (1).
Finally, it is worth noting that, even though we have assumed full commitment on the part of agents, the e¢cient allocations we have constructed are immune to deviations to autarky on the part of agents. To see this, consider the possible incentives on the part of a agent who receives a positive income and is required to make a payment if she reports it truthfully. Might she not be better o¤ by refusing to make the payment and living in autarky from then on? The answer is no, and the reason is that she clearly has the option of reporting zero income and avoiding a payment and receiving an expected utility entitlement that is no worse than autarky. Since the incentive constraint guarantees that she is better o¤ reporting truthfully and making the payment, it is clear that she cannot gain by refusing to make the payment and living in autarky from then on. Thus, the consumer has no incentive to "default" at any date under the above enforcement policy, though this is due to the fact that the low endowment state is zero. This is quite di¤erent from the models of Green (1987) , Thomas and Worrall (1990) , and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
E¢cient steady state allocations in our random matching environment have features which resemble observed credit arrangements. That is, consumers visit a sequence of locations, receiving goods or transferring goods, with credit arrangements governed by a centralized credit agency. The key features of the steady state allocation can be interpreted in terms of a credit mechanism with credit balances, credit limits, and installment payments.
A novelty in the paper is that we obtain a steady state distribution of expected utility entitlements with mobility by modeling a capital accumulation economy with an endogenous interest rate. This assures that the social planner is more patient than consumers in the steady state. We do not impose any bounds on expected utility entitlements to obtain this result, as is done in other work Lucas 1995, Phelan 1995) . Indeed, ours is one of the …rst dynamic insurance economies with private information to include capital accumulation (note also Ravikumar 1997a, 1997b) . If the friction on resource movement implied by random matching turns out not to matter, then the e¢cient steady state allocation in our model would be a natural and useful benchmark for comparing steady state allocations with those obtained subject to an arbitrary market structure and borrowing constraints as in Aiyagari (1994) .
Related environments are used in Aiyagari and Williamson (1998) and Williamson (1998) to study the interaction between money and credit.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: It is obvious that (¿ ¤ ; k ¤ ) attains Ã 0 with resources z:
Therefore,
However, by virtue of (12) we must have
attains the minimum of the expression
Note that in addition to the …rst order conditions (12), the sequence of capital stocks fk ¤ t+1 g 1 t=0 also satis…es the transversality condition. This can be seen as follows. The resource constraints imply that
Hence, (8) implies that
By virtue of the restrictions on g(¢) it follows that the sequence of capital stocks fk ¤ t g 1 t=0 is bounded. Further, the assumption on the price sequence fq t g 1 t=0 implies that
which is the relevant transversality condition. Further,
as f¿ ¤ g attains the minimum in (9) and f¿ g is a feasible choice for that problem.
To check this we only need to verify that f¿ g satis…es the resource constraints for the problem (9) for t¸1 with the sequence of capital stocks fk
This is obvious because
for t¸1 by virtue of (12). Now, integrating (27) with respect to Ã 0 (w 0 ) we
However, adding (26) and (28) The envelope condition is¸=
Thus,
Analogously, the …rst-order necessary condition for w 0 (w) can be written as
if w 0 (w) = w:
Proof. Suppose u 1 (w) < u(y + x ¤ ): Consider increasing u 1 (w) and lowering w 1 (w) in order to keep (1 ¡¯)u 1 (w) +¯w 1 (w) constant. This satis…es all the constraints.
The change in the objective function is given by
We know that when w = ¹ w; w 1 (w) = ¹ w. Then, since V 0 ( ¹ w) = 1, in a neighborhood of w = ¹ w the above expression must be negative, which is a contradiction.2
Proof. Suppose u 0 (w) < u(x ¤ ): Consider raising u 0 (w) and lowering w 0 (w) such that
(1 ¡¯)u 0 (w) +¯w 0 (w) is held constant. This satis…es the promise-keeping constraint.
It also satis…es the incentive constraint as the change in the right-hand side is given
by concavity of u(¢): The change in the objective function is given by
We know that when w = ¹ w; w 0 (w) = ¹ w and V 0 q ( ¹ w) = 1: Hence, in a neighborhood of w = ¹ w; the above expression must be negative, which is a contradiction.2
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
But the …rst-order necessary condition for w 1 (w) implies
which implies w 1 (w) > w: This is a contradiction, hence V 0 q ( ¹ w) < 1:¤ Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose w 1 (ŵ) = ¹ w for someŵ 2 (w; ¹ w): Since w 1 (w) is nondecreasing it follows that w 1 (w) = ¹ w for w 2 [ŵ; ¹ w]: Consider w 2 (w;ŵ).
If w 1 (w) 2 (w; ¹ w) then the …rst-order conditions for w 1 (w) imply that
Hence w 1 (w) > w: If w 1 (w) = ¹ w then again w 1 (w) > w: Finally, we have already seen that w 1 (w)>w. It follows that in a …nite number of steps fw t g ! ¹ w:
Now suppose that w 1 (w) < ¹ w for all w 2 (w; ¹ w): Let w 2 (w; ¹ w): Then w 1 (w) 2 (w; ¹ w) and the …rst-order condition for w 1 (w) yields
Further, w 0 (w) < ¹ w: If w 0 (w) 2 (w; ¹ w) then the …rst-order condition for w 0 (w) yields
If w 0 (w) =w then we have
Combining (29) and (30) we have
Hence fV 0 q (w t )g follows a sub-martingale which is bounded above since V 0 q ( ¹ w) < 1:
Hence fV 0 q (w t )g converges (a.s.), and it converges (a.s.
Proof. The …rst derivative with respect to w 0 (w) from the minimization problem on the right-hand side of the Bellman equation is as follows.
which is less than zero if w 0 (w) =w, greater than zero if w 0 (w) = ¹ w; and equal to zero if w 0 (w) 2 (w; ¹ w): We know that w 0 ( ¹ w) = ¹ w: By continuity we have w 0 (w) >w for w in a neighborhood of ¹ w: Therefore,
with equality if w 0 (w) < ¹ w: Further, by the envelope conditioņ
Hence,
Proof of Proposition 6: Fix w =ŵ: Combining the promise keeping constraint (22) with the incentive compatibility constraint (23) at equality we havê
Therefore C(u 0 (w))¸ĉ 0 . Since the utility function u(¢) is assumed to satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion it is easy to verify that as a consequence we havê
Therefore,¯<
Further,
It follows from the de…nition ofŵ that C(u 0 (w)) ·x: Therefore, ¿ 0 = C(u 0 (w)) ·
x: Further, since w 1 (w)¸w 0 (w) we must have u 1 · u(y + C(u 0 (w))): Hence,
It follows that total transfers associated with w =ŵ are no greater thanx: We will now show that for q su¢ciently close to unity we must have w 1 (w) <ŵ: This will guarantee that the ergodic set for the stochastic process of fw t g will be contained in [w;ŵ):
Therefore, total transfers will be less than the transfers associated with w =ŵ:
These transfers as shown above are no greater thanx = g(k 1 )¡k 1 : It follows that H 2 (q) <x for q su¢ciently close to unity. Hence, we will have the desired result that H 2 (q) < H 1 (q) for some q 2 [¯; 1) because H 1 (q) !x as q ! 1. Now, to
show that for q su¢ciently close to unity we must have w 1 (w) <ŵ we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there is " > 0 such that w 1 (w)¸ŵ for q 2 (1¡"; 1):
Note that our assumptions imply that 0 < ¿ 0 < x ¤ and ¡y < ¿ 1 < x ¤ : The …rst obtains because 0 <ĉ 0 · C(u 0 (w)) ·x < x ¤ and ¿ 0 = C(u 0 (w)): The second obtains because u 1 (w)¸u 0 (w) = u(C(u 0 (w)))¸u(ĉ 0 ) > 0 which implies C(u 1 (w)) > 0 in turn implying ¿ 1 = C(u 1 (w))¡y · C(u 0 (w)) ·x < x ¤ : Therefore, the resource constraints are not binding. Hence, the …rst-order conditions with respect to u 0 and u 1 together with the envelope condition can be used to derive the following equation. Further, the …rst-order condition for u 1 combined with that for w 1 (w) yields C 0 (u 1 (w)) = (1 ¡¯)qV 0 q (w 1 (w)) (1 ¡ q)( 1 ¡¯)qV Dividing through by C 0 (u 1 ); substituting for ± and rearranging we have However, by virtue of (31) the above can not hold for q su¢ciently close to unity. This contradiction establishes that for q su¢ciently close to unity we must have w 1 (w) <ŵ:¤ FOOTNOTES 1. Another interpretation (thanks to Neil Wallace for this), which is perhaps further from what we have in mind, is the state distribution system in the former Soviet Union.
2. The "…rm" in our model earns zero pro…ts, which is not the case for General
Motors, but this is not critical.
3. Some …xed-interest-rate private-information economies have the property that the expected discounted utility of an arbitrarily large fraction of the population eventually becomes arbitrarily low (e.g. Green 1987) , and there are related endogenous interest rate economies (e.g. Atkeson and Lucas 1992) where the wealth distribution continues to fan out over time. Nondegenerate limiting distributions of expected utilities with mobility are obtained by Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and Phelan (1995) by imposing a lower bound on expected utilities.
In Atkeson-Lucas this lower bound is arbitrary, but Phelan makes the lower bound endogenous by supposing that long-term contracts are o¤ered by …rms to workers, and that workers can leave the contractual arrangement at any time and start a new contract with another …rm.
4. Implicitly, we are assuming that capital can be consumed and that g(¢) includes the undepreciated part of capital.
5. The assumption that the low endowment is zero is without loss of generality, provided that we do not allow for defection to autarky. That is, autarky will be the lower bound on expected utilities given that the low endowment is zero, but if the low endowment is strictly positive, then autarky is strictly preferred to the lower bound on expected utilities. As we will see, a positive mass of agents would then prefer to defect to autarky in the steady state that we study.
6. The assumption that u(¢) satis…es decreasing absolute risk aversion guarantees that the constraint set de…ned by (22)- (24) is convex without need to resort to lotteries.
7. In particular, see Lemmas 10, 11, and 12, pp. 81-82 in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) . 10. We have shown that this applies for q =¯; but it can be shown that this is also the case for q <¯: Then V 0 q ( ¹ w) < 1 and there existsŵ 2 (w; ¹ w) such that w 1 (w) = ¹ w for w 2 [ŵ; ¹ w]: Therefore, in a …nite number of steps fw t g ! ¹ w:
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